Introduction
Neither Herzel 10] , Coase 3] , Levin 13] , my coauthors and I 6] , nor any of the other early writers 16] on a market-based system for spectrum allocation thought auctions were all that important. If you are going to allocate licenses to use the spectrum, once and for all (which is close to what is going on), then an auction is probably preferable to administrative hearings. But, what we thought mattered most was what was auctioned|the package of rights and obligations of the recipient and reciprocally of others|not how it was disposed of or how much revenue it generated.
The recent auctions have hardly changed a thing (they suggest the White House may be on a par with the Congress in controlling broadcasting). The object in question is still a license, not a property right. The same old restrictions on frequency assignment, technology, and use still remain. The licenses cannot be allocated by licensees to other users or uses. The spectrum auctions are really more like an initial public o ering of licenses, rather than a market. There is no aftermarket to correct prices and reallocate the resource after the licenses are auctioned o . An e cient capital market requires both a market for new issues and an active aftermarket where issues can be priced and reallocated. In spectrum, we have the initial o ering, but we lack an aftermarket. Consequently, there really has been no gain from selling licenses in what matters, which is the ability to reallocate frequencies among users or uses and the means to generate the price information to guide decisions. Nothing has changed very much concerning regulatory scope and power either. And only a few incentives are altered and not necessarily for the better.
In the earlier writings, auctions were only a way to get property rights out there. They could have given them away or even used the old procedures. The auction will more e ciently allocate spectrum initially, but the market ends there with the license freezing the use, the technology, and associated inputs in transmission and reception. We wanted the exibility and incentives that come with property rights and an active aftermarket in spectrum. Accountability too. Auctions, lotteries, or arbitrary licensing methods do not change these unless there is an active aftermarket. They all have their own problems: attempting to maximize auction revenues may lead to under licensing; reneging on bids or build time and other commitments is just around the corner; licensing still carries the threat that jeopardizes rst amendment rights and so on.
Licensing spectrum through an auction is a departure from past practice; the game is di erent|but it is still a game. There is plenty of scope for strategic and opportunistic behavior, as there was in the old game. No transformation of the assignment game|and that is all the various spectrum disposal mechanisms are|will change enough about what happens after the game to be very important. The aftergame is still the old one as far as frequency allocation matters and rst amendment issues are concerned.
There are two hopeful exceptions to this pessimistic observation; that is, there are two ways the auction could change the aftergame in unexpected ways that might improve frequency allocation and pave the way to implementation of a market-based spectrum policy. My theme in this paper is that it is though resourceful exploitation of opportunities in the post-auction environment that we are likely to get a market-based spectrum policy, not through conscious design. It is through the emergence of an aftermarket that a market-based spectrum policy might come.
How the Auctions might bring an Aftermarket
The rst exception to the proposition that the auctions haven't change a thing would arrive if, somehow, the act of transferring a license by selling it to the highest bidder were to alter the possessor's rights to allocate or contract relative to a licensee who is given the license as a \public trust". That just might happen as the FCC and the courts try to sort out what a license purchaser can do with her frequencies|some new rights may devolve to a purchaser that are not enjoyed by license holders now. Even though the license contains most of the old restrictions, the ingenuity of its new holders in attempting to extract all its value will test every clause in the license for new exibility. In the search for higher license value, innovations will come in the form of new pleadings for exceptions and waivers. The policy of setting bidding quali cations in the recent auction for the bene t of rms that are small or are headed by minorities or women will make the granting of new exibility to licensees more acceptable if some of the early requests for relief come from this group.
The second exception to the conclusion that the post-auction allocation game is no di erent from the present one will come when the winners in the spectrum auctions can't meet their commitments. 1 Bidders are permitted to make installment payments for the bands they acquire in the auctions. Many observers think some of them will not be able to make their payments. If they can't, these failures to meet the terms of the bids will make the next round of auctions less credible. An auction where the winning bidder doesn't have to pay what he bid is not a commitment game after all. Bidding strategies will change if the auction becomes a game where ex post revisions of bid terms are permitted.
The FCC intends to take a hard line on defaults, but in order to prevent overt and open revisions of terms they are likely to be forced to grant some latitude to those who cannot pay so they can extract more revenue from their license. If they don't do it, and some winners renege on their bids, the auction no will longer be credible. Congress will make the FCC x the problems of the potential non-payers to save face and keep the auction credible. There is now too much money and Congressional reputation at stake.
One way to quietly do this is to read more exibility into licenses that are auctioned. Granting new sources of revenues rather than collecting bills is how Congress does these things. Examples are not hard to nd in recent history. Congress granted new lending and borrowing exibility to the banking system when it was about to go under, and they came down so hard on 1 Defaults were widespread in the New Zealand auctions. 14] the FERC that it had to grant pipelines on the verge of bankruptcy new exibility to sell natural gas and operate as contract carriers; the so-called open access orders issued by FERC to rescue the pipelines from bankruptcy allowed markets to gain a toehold and absolutely transformed the natural gas industry. The potential failures among the spectrum bidders will gain exibility to use their frequencies in new ways and to subdivide or combine them in order to extract more revenue to meet their auction commitments; these developments will open a path to a market-based spectrum policy.
In addition, a revenue-hungry Congress and President will look for more frequencies to sell and that will eventually institutionalize procedures for releasing spectrum from one use to another or many others. The compensation schemes which the FCC devises and which the parties negotiate in their deals will become a way of structuring spectrum transactions. Structuring transactions is what property rights do and the schemes that are developed to shift spectrum and combine or subdivide it will o er a constructive basis for a property right.
The present system of spectrum allocation is based on restricting access and freezing technology. Interference protection, as it presently is practiced, is sustainable only when users are constrained by in exible broadcasting rights and frozen technology. Demands for more open access, exibility, and the rapid pace of technological innovation will escalate in the post-auction environment. These will place an intolerable burden on the present methods of preventing interference because they are in exible and work only through an extremely complex balancing of mutual constraints on licensees. This system renders users powerless to manage the spectrum licensed to them. Spectrum users who buy licenses which give them no control over the resource they seek to use will come to see the auction simply as a way to extract user fees from them. Radio and TV broadcasters already see the auction in these terms and will not accept the sale of licenses. Only a property right gives them the exibility to manage the resource and the certainty and protection against future, additional revenue extractions (their specialized assets are subject to appropriation in the regulatory game as it presently is structured).
Emergent Property Rights in Compensation Schemes
The whole spectrum is at stake here, but I will focus where the action is on the 402 MHz radio spectrum in the VHF and UHF bands. Presently, there are 68 channels from 2 to 69, excluding channel 37 which is set aside for radio astronomy. Improved technology has made it possible to operate radio systems at higher frequencies, even well above these TV bands, which once were thought to be technically infeasible. When the FCC set the rules and allocations for television it was not economically feasible to build television receivers that would allow adjacent tv channels to operate. Today's receivers still have only weak adjacent channel rejection characteristics. This is a constraint on allocating new uses to the channels whose only function is to provide separation for indiscriminate receivers. Other constraints are inherent in the large existing investment in receivers, VCRs, cable systems and so on. Digital television is the answer, but its implementation faces similar hurdles; xed investments already made by consumers and cable and broadcasting systems, channel allocations, compatibility problems with existing equipment and so on. Once digital television arrives, it will not matter what frequencies are used for transmission, the receiver will decode at any frequencies, if designed with that broadband capability.
These are some of the problems involved in nding new spectrum in the VHF and UHF bands to auction o . But, these are all problems associated with the present system; they are not inherent in a market system, or one in which the spectrum to be acquired to be auctioned is purchased in an acquisition auction. These irreversible sounding decisions needn't be. All it takes is enough exibility to reallocate spectrum and digital technology that is exible with respect to frequency band.
I rst look at some of the proposed rules for compensating losers as a source of implicit property rights. This comes from the proposed rules in NOPR FCC 95-426, October 13, 1995 4] dealing with relocation of microwave users in the 1850 to 1900 MHz band which has been allocated to broadband PCS. Similar proposals exist for relocating TV broadcasters, so little generality is lost by focussing on the PCS bands.
General Issues At the outset, it should be noted that the clearing procedure creates what is essentially a bilateral monopoly negotiation between the PCS auction winning bidder and the incumbent microwave licensee who is to be relocated. It is this bargaining game that is the source of many of the restrictions and rules the Commission has set for this process. The ultimatum of the game is that the new licensee may request mandatory relocation of the incumbent, but must pay the cost. Some sort of limit on the upper bound of these costs is contemplated and a year limit on the bargaining is proposed. (Using an auction to clear the frequencies voluntarily would eliminate this problem.)
The Commission grants only minor technical changes: decreases in power, minor changes in antenna height, minor coordinate changes, reductions in bandwidth, and minor changes in structure, ground elevation, and equipment. A further large, and unstated, restriction on permitted adjustments is there is no provision for the abandonment of frequencies by the incumbent, a move that eliminates relocation cost entirely and one that may be the cheapest alternative in many cases. Such a move is rational, however, only if the licensee receives compensation. However, compensation is authorized only for relocation and, hence, an incumbent will always choose to be relocated even if he would abandon for a payment that is less than his relocation cost.
The game is not incentive-compatible. The incumbent has few incentives to truthfully reveal the relocation cost and many to overstate it. The PCS licensee has few incentives to identify the extent to which its operations would interfere with the incumbent's operations. The early evidence is compelling on this score. Here are just a few examples of many similarly exaggerated claims 2 
:
Incumbent has 13 paths, six or seven of which exist in the PCS segment. PCS licensee nds one path that a ects its frequencies. Incumbent wants its entire system relocated with a digital upgrade and $18 million dollars.
Incumbent wants buy out of 35 links at $12 million. PCS licensee estimates it will interfere with 29 links and estimates relocation cost to be $5 million.
Incumbent's 20 link network contains 9 links with PCS co-channel interference. Incumbent wants entire network upgraded to digital, including the 9 co-channels at $17 million. PCS licensee estimates relocation cost for the 9 links at $1.5 million.
Cost-sharing The need for a cost sharing formula follows from the fact that clearing a link may bene t more than one PCS licensee at a time. Without some sharing, there is a free rider problem. Of course, the licensees know this and should be capable of devising sharing agreements of their own making. The barrier to all this is the highly complex negotiations that are the consequence of the relocation mechanism itself. Given this complexity, a formula may be justi ed for the simpli cation that it brings to the process. On the other hand, no one formula can cover all the details and the often highly individualistic negotiations that are involved here.
What is not clear in the sharing proposal is just what the PCS licensee gets once he has cleared a spectrum block. If they inherit the incumbent's right to interference protection, then we have the potential makings of a property right. If, on the other hand, they simply inherit the incumbent's right to be relocated they have tenuous rights at best.
An interesting feature of the formula is that when an unused microwave link is relocated, the rst PCS licensee to use the freed band will pay full compensation to the relocator. If only compensation could exceed the cost, this feature would open unused links to arbitrage. And one of the ways to qualify to move the link and receive compensation would be to shut down the microwave service so as to qualify for the unused exemption. Should the FCC decide that premium payments are reimbursable, this arbitrage path might open up an indirect way to abandon and reallocate spectrum.
Reimbursement Right An interference right is an explicit part of a licensee's protection. When the microwave link is relocated the incumbent licensee retains broadcast rights to operate on the new link. What happens to the interference protection he received on the old link? The new PCS user should receive both the operating rights inherent in the new license as well as the interference protection of the prior occupant of the band. This is important for the new licensee may not be ready to broadcast on the frequency opened when the microwave incumbent was cleared. If another PCS begins operations that interfere with the link's interference rights, what protection is there for the party who cleared the band?
The FCC proposes to resolve this issue through a reimbursement right. This right would be separate from the microwave license and would not be a right of protection against interference. The reimbursement right would entitle the holder to compensation for certain costs which it incurred in clearing the band. The Commission proposes the reimbursement right as an alternative to an interference protection largely on administrative grounds; they retain disposition of the frequencies this way and can transfer or cancel licenses without incurring any obligations to protect the PCS supplier who cleared the band. If they exercise this discretion, and cancel the license, for example, the party who cleared the band gets no compensation. If they assign it elsewhere, the clearing party gets only his costs compensated if there is interference. Hence, a cleared but not yet used band may receive no compensation if the license is cancelled or transferred by the FCC.
An interference right is not a property right, but it does give some very speci c protections. It entitles the licensee to ask the FCC to shut down or alter interfering transmissions. The problem is that what interferes with the licensee's communications depends on the receivers, their signal rejection characteristics (which are rather poor relative to what they could be), and where the receivers are located in space. Time is also a consideration. The result is that an interference right only protects a restricted range of current activities on the part of the licensee and permits squatting on other parts compared to a fully speci ed property right. These considerations may have been at the base of the industry's preference for a reimbursement right over an interference right. 3 Neither an interference right nor a reimbursement right are property rights. A reimbursement right is severed from spectrum|it is not an asset whose price and exchange will alter the allocation of spectrum. An interference right protects only present reception at the current state of technology and permits adverse possession of spectrum dimensions where there is no interference.
Clearinghouse An industry clearinghouse is supported by the industry and the FCC. This is a potentially important innovation, though current plans severely limit its scope. Nonetheless, clever use of the clearinghouse could help a market develop. Keeping records of \owners" of reimbursement rights, relocations, and other transactions is a rst step toward identifying parties and claims on the resource. More importantly, the clearinghouse is the place where interference standards and con ict resolution will be located. This means that the industry gains some control in devising operational and economically meaningful standards of interference protection and operation. These, for the rst time, will be designed to deal with real con icts, not administratively determined standards. Hence, there is room for an evolution of standards that are likely to contain all the earmarks of property rights.
Since the clearinghouse will also clear nancial claims (reimbursement rights and relocation payments), there is a basis for nancial trading to emerge and for spectrum reallocations to develop between the members of the clearinghouse. The trading of nancial claims and interference protections could emerge in unanticipated ways through the procedures and claims reconciliation processes of the clearinghouse.
It is not hard to imagine (in theory) that reimbursement shares could be subdivided and combined within a framework of clearinghouse-devised interference procedures in such a way that band splitting, time sharing, and regionally integrated co-and cross-band services could develop without changing a single license. This is not fanciful, a similar development rapidly took place in natural gas trading when just a little scope was permitted in the trading of interruptible pipeline transmission. From this small beginning, a market in gas and transmission developed (De Vany and Walls 7]). The EuroBond market developed out of simple interest swaps, and many other highly e ective markets had their similarly humble beginnings (Miller 15]). As more spectrum is sold and falls into the clearinghouse, broader trading opportunities become available and we move closer to an active aftermarket in spectrum.
Relocation Guidelines Another promising development that may facilitate the emergence of industry-de ned property rights, or at least trading instruments that increase the scope of spectrum uses and allocative plasticity, is in the relocation guidelines. De Vany, et. al. 6] argued that a rst step in de ning property rights is in de ning outputs rather than inputs.
In the relocation guidelines we nd the rst glimmerings of a change from de ning spectrum in terms of the inputs to de ning it in terms of outputs.
In seeking to clarify what it means by \comparable facilities" the Commission cites three main factors that will determine when a user has been relocated to comparable facilities. A replacement facility is deemed comparable when the relocated user can achieve the same reliability, communications throughput and operating cost that she had before.
All these relate to what the user can do|what her production possibilities are|not what the input speci cations call for. Hence, comparable facilities determinations will be based on signal properties, signal to noise ratios, bit error rates, and the things that really matter in achieving communications rates and coverage. This is a drastic change from the granting of a license with speci ed operating restrictions, technology, and all the other inputs speci ed in advance. \Comparable" means operation in the eld in e ective signal to noise ratios, just how a property right must be de ned (and how licenses should have been written in the rst place).
By this shift to e ective and reliable information transmission from input speci cations, a great deal of exibility will be granted in these comparability decisions that was not there before. Alternate technologies can be used to achieve comparability. If less spectrum can be used to achieve the same output, the means are now there to exploit the ways this can be done. This was never true before and this change is a water shed that will bring new exibility.
License Terms On April 4, 2005, all microwave operator licensees will become secondary licensees relative to PCS licensees if the PCS service is operating. This o ers an intriguing possibility. Suppose the PCS operator built the comparable facility the microwave operator now is using. Let the licensees now change roles, with the PCS becoming the primary licensee and the microwave service becoming the secondary licensee. At that point, the microwave system will have to compensate the primary license holder for continuing operation. The microwave system will have zero value to the operator, who no longer has operating rights should the PCS operator exercise its primacy.
Recognizing this today, they might have the foresight to enter a lease at the beginning in order to avoid the role change from incumbent to claimant which they both go through over the ten year license period. An easy way to do this is for the PCS operator to build the system for the microwave incumbent and lease it to him for 10 years (or longer). Knowing that their present roles as incumbent/claimant will be reversed in ten years neutralizes some of the bargaining power the present incumbent has over a PCS supplier anxious to get a service started to generate revenues to pay his auction commitment. The Pareto superior leasing arrangement constitutes an implicit trade in spectrum.
Relaxing Restrictions to Avert Failures
It may be a good thing that the PCS winners are permitted to pay over time. Almost surely some or many of them will not be able to meet their payment schedules. As I argued in the beginning, adjustments cannot be made in payment terms since to do so would undermine the credibility of the auction. The high bids are a likely source of default, but equally important, the cumbersome, bilateral monopoly negotiations that are required to move the microwave incumbent will stall the start up of service, deferring revenue streams and raising costs for the PCS bidder. The likely answer is for the FCC, or Congress, to grant some additional exibility to licensees to transfer, sublet, or otherwise extract more revenue from their bands.
Because greater revenue exibility rather than reduced payments is the most likely adjustment to avert failure, this exibility will become an important avenue for the creation of property rights. How these will come is not predictable. But, it will come and be important. Revenue exibility will be the major force for exibility in spectrum allocation and use. In this section, I try to anticipate what kind of transactions might emerge in order to grant new revenue possibilities to PCS licensees if they are unable to meet their payments. These transactions become the basis for nascent property rights.
Subcarrier Transactions Subcarrier transactions are a quick and readily implemented way to squeeze out more revenue from existing frequencies. They commonly are done in television frequencies, where a subcarrier frequency carries the ubiquitous elevator music we all have learned to hate. A PCS operator who cannot get service up or is undersubscribed might gain approval to lease out sub-frequencies as an interim revenue-raising measure.
Time Splitting Time splitting is another quick and easy dimension on which to extract more revenue. At o -peak periods or seasons, some frequencies might be leased to other users. Many sophisticated time-sharing arrangements are possible now that computers and radios have come together in the new technologies.
Broadband Frequency Hopping Broad band radio transmissions could operate over the whole band held by a PCS licensee. 2] Because the technology permits broad band to hop to temporarily unused frequencies, a PCS licensee might be able to extract extra revenue from a broad band broadcaster without losing any signi cant signal to noise ratio. This is a potential source of revenue even before the microwave links have all been moved and made operational. Some PCS companies have broad band technology in mind for their operations and if they implement their service before a PCS licensee in a nearby territory, they may be in a position to add the territory to their service area through broadband operations in the licensee's area.
Regional Operations Besides using broadband to integrate territories, more explicit arrangements may emerge. A licensee who cannot meet its payment commitments might apply to the FCC to merge with a more successful licensee in an adjacent territory. Alternatively, a licensee facing default may perceive additional revenue sources from splitting a territory among sub operators, who may, themselves, have adjacent territories.
New Uses and Users Adding new classes of users can also be a source of additional revenues for a nancially strapped PCS licensee. Broadening the use made of the bands to encompass other uses or users is an easy step for the FCC to approve. The simplest step is just to open up an existing broadcast service to new users. No changes in frequency allocations need be made when the same service is simply used to transmit signals for di erent users. A more liberal change would permit an existing use of the band to be changed to a new use or users.
Flexibility and the Prisoner's Dilemma
When one buyer of an auctioned license starts to fall behind on payments and is granted new sources of revenue to catch up, others will apply as well. Not only will hardship cases apply to reap the bene ts of new degrees of freedom, so will everyone else.
Political support for regulating spectrum use is based on the bene ts that inure to various coalitions; regulation never had any real connection to solving the interference problem. 4 Moreover
that results in all the ine ciencies that plague the present system. A property right in spectrum solves the xed point problem by giving every user a de nite time, place and bandwidth to use as they see t to do. 6] Compatible use of the spectrum is guaranteed by de ning speci c rights in time, area and bandwidth that exhaust the spectrum landscape.
Because the FCC de nes its task as interference protection rather than specifying spectrum rights, it faces an intractable problem of calculating a compatible speci cation of technologies and operations that are non-interfering in an era when technology is rapidly advancing. Consequently, there is no xed point equilibrium which solves the interference game unless the FCC blocks technological advances. This is just how it operated in the past, but that policy is becoming untenable.
It is a balancing of mutual constraints that keeps the system together and maintains a regulatory equilibrium. In order to gain interference protections, licensees are severely constrained in how they operate. They have little assurance that others will not be permitted to operate in such a way that will constrain their future operations or ability to expand coverage or adopt new technology. Radio and television broadcasters gain if licensing limits competitors, but they face constraints themselves in how they may operate and what they may broadcast. They sit on licenses that can be withdrawn on rather arbitrary grounds. Had the FCC granted licensees blocks of spectrum areas that covered their intended range of operations and protected them from invasion they would not have had to freeze technology and frequency allocations to solve the interference problem. But, then, I think the FCC would have been much less powerful with this system as they could not so readily leverage interference protection into the ability to grant monopoly broadcasting franchises (which is what they have become).
Interference protection and protection from competition are tied together, but they depend on a set of increasingly unstable constraints. The spectrum auctions, the demands for new exibility in frequency allocations, the rapid pace of technological change, and the increasing demand for spectrum which lies warehoused in unused allocations are placing too many new demands on the FCC. It will not be able to maintain a consistent set of interference and competition protections in this new environment. As soon as exemptions and new degrees of freedom are extended to this coalition or that group of spectrum licensees, the constraints are relaxed selectively in a way that changes competitive conditions for other coalitions.
Think of a regulatory equilibrium as a collection of balanced coalitions that are relatively stable with respect to one another (the relevant concept is of a coalition-proof, nash equilibrium coalition structure), then you realize that the granting of a relaxation for a coalition a ects the stability of all the coalitions in the structure. Then, you realize how a small change can have large and unforeseen consequences. Why? Because many interlocking and interdependent constraints are a ected. A seemingly minor change, like granting a PCS licensee new freedom to subdivide the band to gain access to a new territory, can cascade through the system and render many other coalitions unstable in the new environment.
The most important forces destabilizing the regulated equilibrium will come when sectors in the public perceive that they do not have access to a service that some other group does. Then the rallying point becomes \access" and the arbitrary limits that presently are maintained in the name of interference protection or in the purported cause of keeping the spectrum as a public asset will lose their legitimacy. \Access" was the rallying cry that broke apart the old system of regulating natural gas pipelines and natural gas prices and open access is coming as deregulation spreads from natural gas to power, railroads, and, eventually, telecommunications.
The prisoner's dilemma aspect of the situation is apparent. Each user tries to get new revenue sources or capabilities for herself. This requires that some constraints that bene t a di erent group of licensees must be relaxed. Opening these new avenues diminishes the bene ts that other groups get from the restrictions to which they must submit. Because everyone's bene ts depend on the constraints on someone else, a small liberalization for one diminishes the gains others get from adhering to the constraints they are under. They push for liberalizations too.
I think this dynamic will be lethal to the present system of administrative spectrum allocations which require substantial discrimination among parties and over-restrictive limits on access by the broader public to what will become the most important and abundant communication medium of all. The hole is already in the dike and how it will turn out is hard to say. But, there is no turning back to the old way of doing things and the frequency allocation tables will increasingly become exible. The FCC will not be able to keep up with the processing and political demands on it and support for the system will erode. When its legitimacy can be challenged on the grounds that it limits non-interfering access to the spectrum by a public aware of new services and opportunities, the FCC will be gone.
Network Building
The FCC will have to move in the direction of greater exibility and decentralization. The demand for exibility and access and the strong need to make spectrum allocation better suited to building communications networks will be the major forces changing spectrum allocation to move it toward a market system. Network building never was a consideration before, and communications networks have been balkanized geographically and by communications modality since the very beginning of spectrum management and allocation by the FCC. The opportunities for building networks across regions and that exploit multiple technologies and are exible in their shape and uses are great because these are the areas where regulation sealed o arbitrage and innovation in order to create a stable structure of coalitions in support of regulation.
Innovations Regulatory hurdles often spur nancial, technical, and trading innovations and it is through these the auctioned licenses might evolve into a useful form of property right. The arbitrage opportunities will shape trades and these will re ne the right and integrate the network through exible transactions. Many of these innovations will render xed licenses obsolete.
Consider just a few technologies and contracting innovations that are likely to obsolesce the present system of licensing xed technologies and uses into rigid frequency allocations.
Broad band broadcasting. Shannon's information theory tells us that if you have enough bandwidth, you can transmit information at high accuracy. Tying computers and radios together has made it possible to broadcast at high accuracy using low signal to noise ratios over broad band channels. This sort of information can be transmitted down in the ambient noise that a conventional broadcaster sees on her channel. Consequently, a conventional licensee to authorize broad band broadcasting on her channel without any interference to her signal to noise ratio.
The capacity for broad band broadcasting are not unlimited within a channel, unless it is arbitrarily wide. For a channel as narrow as a TV broadcast channel, say, a large ow of broad band information may raise the ambient noise level and this can be met through higher broadcast power, better noise rejection characteristics in receivers, and so on. One of the easier ways to extract more revenue from a channel would be for the licensee to let broad band broadcasters use it. This kind of subletting of channels would begin to shape the de nition of a spectrum property right with respect to ambient noise, which is one of the trickiest areas to specify. I think broadband radio and property rights are consistent with one another; broadband radio will raise the ambient noise level and, ultimately, must hit an upper bound on information ow. Having property rights will help to set the noise level and solve the common pool problem. If channel capacity becomes so high that it is not scarce, then the property right provides a graceful way to let the spectrum become a free good. What will happen is that the value of enforcing the right will fall to the level where enforcement has no return. This cannot happen with a license. In this regard, a property system of spectrum o ers a graceful path to letting spectrum become a public good if technology succeeds in expanding its information carrying capacity so far beyond its use that consumption becomes non-rivalrous.
Frequency swaps. Many reallocations of spectrum can take place without transferring licenses. Two licensees have only to let one another use their channels under some form of barter arrangement. These kinds of swaps, barter transactions, are common in many industries. Oil and natural gas companies trade commodities with one another when they occupy di erent territories. To do so saves on transport costs. The EuroBond market began with interest rate swaps among a few traders looking to avoid taxes. It now is one of the most important nancial markets. Frequency swaps are a natural way to build integrated transmission networks. You let me run signals through your communications links and I let you run them through mine. The result is an expanded communications area for both parties. As these swaps become routine, they will de ne some of the dimensions of frequency trades and the obligations and rights of the parties. From there, a system of formal trading and property rights is but a short step away.
Contracting innovations. Suppose that spectrum licensees were to become contract carriers. Right now they either are common carriers, like the phone company, or private carriers, like a radio station. Keep all the other aspects of the license intact, but change who has access to the channel. This sort of change would parallel what happened in natural gas, when pipelines were transformed under the so-called open access rulings of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission from private to contract carriers. In gas, this was a revolutionary change. 5 So would it be in telecommunications and spectrum allocation. Under a system of contract broadcasting, for example, a radio show producer would contract with a station for bandwidth and time to broadcast his show. The station would sell time and frequency slots within its capacity to any comer. Access to broadcasting would be open to anyone. Unused slots would be o ered in a spot market. All this parallels the situation in natural gas transmission trading. Such a system makes public access to spectrum real, not the fanciful ction it is now. It becomes very simple to build a network of stations; one contracts for the bandwidth and time slots with the individual stations and then puts on whatever it is that you want to broadcast. A system of contracting for bandwidth and time slots could reproduce the nancial syndication that we have now in broadcasting, but on another dimension that would free the broadcast producer from the content regulation that stations now exercise. As long as I buy the bandwidth and you are a common carrier, you do not get to decide what I ship with my electrons. Since the station is no longer responsible for program content, the FCC can no longer hold its license hostage to content. With access to bandwidth open to the whole public, content regulation becomes a direct limitation on someone's free speech and is no longer clouded by the phony public trust claim which holds the broadcaster's license hostage. In one fell swoop, broadcast content regulation is weakened or maybe even eviscerated. The free speech which we exercise when we use audible bandwidth at a public corner will then extend to broadcast bandwidth at higher frequencies.
Computers and Compatibility. Given the exibility which computers bring to the interface, interface compatibility becomes a non-issue. This holds for sending signals over di erent modalities and it holds for the interface between the communication system and the user. All the background interconnections and signal manipulation and coding can be hidden from the user, who doesn't care as long as the delivered signal is readable. There has always been this tendency for regulators to segment modalities and technologies and to limit interconnections between modes. For example, railroads and canals were never able to work out single-tari , intermodal hauls for their customers. Sometimes this segmentation has to do with regulatory jurisdiction, as in the case of the interstate and intrastate pipelines. And that is true in telecommunications where state and federal jurisdictional boundaries have to a large extent shaped the organization of the industry and the shape of the communications networks. In part, the segmentation is justi ed as a requirement for coordinating frequencies with collaborative assets, like receivers and broadcasting equipment. The coordination issue, which set much of the agenda and industry organization in telecommunications no longer stands against the technology. Compatibility among broadcasters and receivers in future generations need no longer be an issue if interfaces are computerized and frequency allocation is exible. Intermodal connections and information ows over many di erent modalities and di erent telecommunications subnetworks will be handled transparently by computers. It will all be just one big network from the standpoint of the user, who will not be cognizant of the particular frequencies or links over which communication ows. As the old and outmoded frequency allocation techniques for maintaining compatible interfaces is outstripped by technology, it becomes much more important to have exible standards and many frequencies and modalities available for building communications networks. Frequency management will have to focus more on the interference problem than on compatibility and the shift of focus will be on interference in the eld, not interference management through xed frequency assignments and frozen technology.
Switching spectrum use and users. With present and future technologies, signals moving along multiple transmission modes, many paths, and di erent segments of bandwidth are not only possible, but essential. So many arbitrage paths around regulation and xed frequency assignments will be available that much of the content of regulation will become unenforceable. Not only that, when escape from regulatory re-strictions becomes easy, there are no bene ts left for the regulator to confer on groups or interests|they lose their clientele.
Integration and Access The prime forces reshaping spectrum management policy will be those forces governing the integration of communications networks and the conditions of access. Economists tend to model network integration as an externalities problem and, in doing so, they embrace a centralized mind set with all its baggage. Part of the baggage which they take on is an implicit belief that a centralized form of control is essential for solving the network externality problem. This comes from two aspects of the model. One, is in formulating the game as a simultaneous move game rather than as an evolutionary game. The other is in an implicit belief that order comes from centralized processes.
When the network externality problem is modelled this way, a natural conclusion seems to be that only a decision-maker who can look over the entire network to internalize externalities can solve the problem by setting the interface standards and the con guration of the network. This argument is the raison d'etre for the FCC, the FAA, the CAB, the old FTC, the FERC and for the Soviet Union. Few of them are with us any longer and it is clear why: the argument is wrong.
It is wrong empirically. Most regulated networks are, in fact, balkanized, not integrated. Just to take one example, the FTC segmented rail and truck transportation into ne divisions, even to the point of specifying what routes and commodities each trucker and railroad could carry and what gateways they could move through. Even now rail and trucking systems individually are poorly integrated and they are hardly integrated with one another at all; barges stand almost alone when all three modes have much to contribute to an integrated transportation network. I have already mentioned some of the ways in which communications and spectrum-using industries are segmented; what network compatibility we do have in telecommunications is obtained at high cost|frozen allocations and technologies, users locked into rigid frequency bands, poor incentives to economize on bandwidth, closed markets and too little competition.
Many important and well functioning networks are formed through decentralized means. Natural gas is one example. There was a grid of pipelines covering the United States, which until a decade ago, was segmented and balkanized because of the way pipelines were regulated. Now, natural gas ows over an integrated network of pipelines whose connection structure simply emerged in a decentralized fashion after users were given access to transmission. Trading in interruptible transmission was one of the primary mechanisms that brought this integration about. Natural gas is now priced so accurately across every interconnection node of the network that prices everywhere fall within arbitrage limits 7]. This never was the case before decentralized transmission trading developed and regulation was the barrier standing in the way of arbitrage and network integration.
The argument is not wrong theoretically, it is just one special case of the equilibria one can get with minor changes in the model. Making it an evolutionary game, which ts almost any historically developed network better as a model, where moves are coupled with some local structure of interaction produces a dynamic with integrated and compatible networks as a strong attractor. While a locally interacting, decentralized process may exhibit path dependence (what doesn't, even regulatory decisions do) and may settle onto less than optimal equilibria (from the all knowing modeler's perspective) they show an adaptability and pluralism that makes them dynamically e cient. With enough noise and the ability to make exible choices, decentralized systems do nd optimal equilibria readily and quickly 5]. And they do not hit the information bottlenecks that centrally planned and coordinated mechanisms do.
If, as I have argued, the forces of network integration in the future will come from the bottom rather than from the FCC at the top, then there is room for many kinds of trading and contracting innovations that have network building as their objective. What I am saying is that the present, balkanized structure of communications networks a ords so many arbitrage and integrating opportunities that technological and spectrum trading innovations will be aimed at building networks.
Integration Thrives on Subdivision One of the most important innovations that will let network integration proceed is subdivision. Subdivision is crucial for building integrated communications networks. This is not paradoxical. Building networks is a problem in combinatorics; taking the pieces and making the permitted transformations to assemble the desired network con guration. The ability to combine and divide spectrum bands and geographical areas will be one of the most important attributes of a exible system of spectrum allocation.
Emergent property rights, predicated on subdivision and combination, would likely have a property similar to what is called an undivided interest. An existing frequency band and area can be made into a collection of undivided interests by creating sub-bands and sub-areas as exclusive and undivided interests. These interests can be held by many parties, or, as at present, by just one (the licensee). As I argued before, licensees bent on getting more revenue out of their allocated frequencies will rst subdivide by time, area, or frequency band and then transfer or lease or swap those segments that have more value to other parties.
Formalizing these segments through clearing house operations or through aftermarket transactions (if permitted by the FCC and how can they not?) opens the way to exible and integrated network building. Each existing license becomes a portfolio of undivided interests to be shu ed around and recombined with others in whatever ways o er more revenue or lower costs. As soon as we have an aftermarket in spectrum undivided interests, it will be possible to exibly con gure communications networks and then dissolve them by selling o the interests.
The cost of entry and exit will fall dramatically for many kinds of services and network con gurations because a liquid market in spectrum interests entails a low cost of buying, using, and then reselling to make hit and run entry into a market or service. Flexible interfaces will not care what frequency the service comes over and spectrum arbitrage will make most services and network con gurations doable at next to no xed cost. Fixed cost is just an attribute of specialized and illiquid assets. Make spectrum liquid and interfaces exible and the assets are no longer specialized or illiquid.
I want to emphasize that the undivided interest can be bootstrapped from existing licenses initially. We don't have to formally mandate a spectrum property right, just let it happen. An undivided interest recognizes the bandwidth and time and geographic attributes of the existing licensee's rights and accords interference and broadcast protections to subdivided segments in these dimensions. Then the clearinghouse works out what the interference standards are and ties them to the so-called reimbursement right that the FCC intends to grant to each PCS licensee. This is almost enough. As these procedures are worked out in the PCS bands and new bands are put up for auction, a signi cant segment of the spectrum will come to be allocated by market forces. There will be constraints on who can participate in this market initially, but they quickly will become politically unacceptable and access will broaden to encompass non-traditional spectrum users.
The cumbersome spectrum clearing and relocation methods mandated by the FCC will be superceded by a more uid clearinghouse market. This aftermarket will support price discovery and inform bidders about spectrum value and shape their bids in subsequent auctions. And their bids will rise above present levels to the extent that the clearinghouse and aftermarket lower the cost of clearing incumbents.
The last two auctions really don't give us good estimates of the value of spectrum reallocations because of the heavy overhang of the highly uncertain and cumbersome relocation procedures mandated by the FCC. Any rational bidder has to shave his bid down by enough to be compensated for the cost of extracting the spectrum from an incumbent given what is nearly a monopoly position from which to negotiate the terms of her relocation. That can be xed, which is what I discuss in the next section.
6 Using an Auction to Free Up and Reallocate Spectrum
The government wants to reap the very considerable revenue that is available from reallocating spectrum from lower to higher valued uses. 6 The bidders have to pay a relocation cost that is not truthfully revealed by the incumbent. The government can't just take the spectrum and, thus, we have this relocation problem. The real solution is to hold an auction on both sides, one to clear spectrum voluntarily from incumbents and the other to reallocate it to new users.
By design, the supply side auction would reveal the opportunity costs of the incumbent, rather than the in ated costs that are all too evident in the claims we have seen. If permitted to bid in the next round for other spectrum, an incumbent could voluntarily be relocated to another band. When a licensee can sell a spectrum band high and buy a di erent one low, relocation is painless and, maybe, even pro table. The spread between the bid and o er prices is the gain in e ciency from spectrum reallocation. The problem is that unless the government gets the spread on each transaction there will be no revenue for the treasury and the motives for the auctions will vanish. This is an easy problem to x as there are many auction mechanisms that will yield revenue for the treasury while eliciting a voluntary supply of spectrum. If we didn't have to capture any value for the government, we could just hold a double oral auction and let it converge to a clearing price. This may leave little spread in the bid and o er prices and little revenue for the government, which is, after all, its only reason for the exercise.
We need an auction which induces each bidder and incumbent to reveal their true values, meaning the auction must discriminate according to their reservation values and in the prices they pay and receive. Then the government takes the di erence for each transaction that is made. If the auction is in a xed area and frequency band, where there is relative homogeneity among the pieces, then the bands are interchangeable, no matter who sells or buys them. The government can take bids and o ers, match transactions to maximize the value added, and take all of the di erence.
If the auction is incentive-compatible and true values are revealed, then the prices received and paid will di er among the parties according to their private values and costs. Thus, the auction is a discriminating one and all the area between the demand and supply curves can be captured by the government auctioneer. The auctioneer only matches bids and o ers and need take no position in any transaction and, thus, bears no risk. I have in mind what is essentially a modi ed Groves-Clark auction where there is no budget balance constraint; the government is not constrained to break even, which would destroy incentive-compatibility, which we need in order to assure positive government revenue, so both these requirements go in the same direction.
Conclusions
My somewhat optimistic conclusion is that much of the ground work has already been put in place for spectrum policy naturally to evolve to a market-based system. Without anyone intending a market-based spectrum policy as the outcome, the basis for an evolution to that outcome already exists and we will probably get there, not by design, but through a natural evolution of the present system. 7 Markets will come to spectrum they way they always develop: by fumbling through minor and major crises and by bootstrapping tradeable instruments and coordinating institutions from what we have now.
Rather than attempt to design a policy for implementing a market-based spectrum policy, we should just let it happen. Explicit attempts to implement markets will coalesce interests against them, but if we let each of the diverse interests play their own strategies in the prisoner's dilemma, the system will unravel by itself. The basis for a bottom-up evolution of such a policy already exists or is close to being put in place and an evolution of spectrum allocation to a market system will happen more rapidly than trying to plan it and make it happen. The idea that markets are implemented or designed is the same old mentality that gave us planning and regulation in the rst place. My \plan" for a market system is no plan. It is the Field of Dreams plan: auction the spectrum and the market will come.
All we need is a little luck in how the after-market operates and a crisis that raises perceptions of the vastly di erent privileges and restrictions on access to spectrum and spectrum-using services which the FCC has created and enforces. The auctions and the aftergames they bring forth will raise those perceptions. The fragile coalitions of spectrum licensees and political interests which the FCC is trying to manage and hold together are sustainable only by practicing pervasive discrimination in who has access to the spectrum and the services it provides. If we are lucky, we will have a court decision that slaps down one of the discriminatory rulings the FCC is bound to make in clearing or selling spectrum. 8 With its ability to grant discriminatory access 7 Kwerel and Williams propose incremental reforms that could promote this natural evolution. 12] 8 A few critical judicial decisions were instrumental in bringing open access to gas to spectrum weakened or gone, the FCC will lose control and the support it needs. Once suppliers and customers taste open access to spectrum there will be no turning back. 9 In terms of concrete policy proposals that have a chance of gaining acceptance and of moving us along the path to a market-based policy, I propose that spectrum auctions be extended beyond their present scope. Though much design e ort has gone into the auctions 14], too little has gone into worrying about how to acquire and clear the spectrum. By creating a relocationcompensation game that has perverse incentives and bilateral monopoly bargaining positions, the values gotten in the auctions are probably well below what they should be. Each bidder has to fold into her bid the delays, negotiating costs, and the incumbent's in ated estimates of the impact of PCS operations on his microwave system.
Rather than forcibly clear spectrum and create perverse post-auction relocation-compensation games, which impact poorly on auction values and jeopardize the start up of new services, the FCC should use something like a procurement auction to acquire a voluntary supply of spectrum from current licensees and then auction it o . There are auction schemes in which spectrum can be voluntarily reallocated from old to new licensees that will yield the government even greater revenue than the present system. This is guaranteed because the least-valued spectrum will be o ered rst, the o er prices will re ect the incumbent's true relocation or opportunity cost, the bids will not discount the incumbent's vastly in ated costs of relocating to other bands, and more spectrum will be freed because many users will simply vacate their bands rather than relocate. The bid and o er markets can be combined into a single double-sided auction where bids and o ers are made pipeline transmission, which was the critical turning point in the transformation of the natural gas industry. 7] 9 Gilder 8] provides a glimpse of the kind of access to personal communications broadband radio, minicells, and the microchip could make possible.
simultaneously.
I also propose that new exibility be granted to permit an aftermarket to operate. The basis for this could be a liberalized clearinghouse for trading divided or fractional interests in the spectrum use dimensions that inhere in broadcast licenses.
The most important and readily implemented step toward a market system would be to rede ne how interference protection is accomplished. Rather than seek to protect licensees from interference by xing their broadcast and receiving technology and all its related inputs, the FCC should restate licenses in terms of the output dimensions|the frequency band, the area, and the time dimensions in which the licensee's signal strength is permitted to reach speci ed levels. Once this is done, interference protection no longer requires technology, transmitter locations, and all the related inputs and operations to be frozen. Interference protection shifts to the eld where measurable signal strengths are recorded and veri ed and interference issues become very much like issues of trespass. 10 Even within a framework of licensing, such a system would bring new exibility to spectrum use and gracefully accommodate new technology.
A major concern held by many is that spectrum auctions will induce the FCC to make spectrum use more restrictive in order to create scarcity rents for the bidders and capture this induced value in higher bids. The line of thinking I have employed here suggests that, while possible, this is unlikely. And the supply auction that I have proposed negates the possibility entirely.
Among the reasons deliberate restriction on frequency access is unlikely are these. First, it is di cult to reconcile the loss of protections which incumbents su er when spectrum bands are \refarmed" in order to release them for redistribution by auction with greater protections for the new licenses who purchase the refarmed spectrum. This asymmetrical treatment of incumbents and bidders is unlikely to be politically supportable.
Second, restrictions destroy value; it is only when your competitors are constrained more than you are that value is created under the present system. Granting the ability to use and transfer spectrum exibly among uses and users adds value to the license. In addition, it means that what you bid is not a sunk cost if the venture goes under because you can sell or use the spectrum somewhere else. In a market with exible spectrum use and allocation, spectrum is no longer specialized to a particular venture so that much of its purchase price can be recovered by selling it. Flexibility of use and the ability to transfer among users makes spectrum value liquid so that xed cost shrinks and may even vanish. A liquid aftermarket raises value in the primary market, and the way to a liquid aftermarket is through exibility in spectrum use and trading.
Finally, spectrum value is limited by the cumbersome bargaining game which the FCC has set up over relocation costs. Fixing the post-auction relocation game is the easiest way to create high value. And the way to do that is to run an auction to procure voluntarily from incumbent licensees the spectrum that the FCC wishes to make available to other uses (this is also a way to test the value of current use against alternative uses of the spectrum). From there it is but a short step to the adaptive exibility Herzel, Coase and other proponents had in mind when they called for spectrum markets.
Only the task of building institutions for the aftermarket remains, and we shall have a start on them when the clearinghouse begins to routinize the operations|recording \title" and clearing relocation costs and reimbursement rights|the FCC plans to give them. An important and easily implemented step toward a spectrum aftermarket would be for the FCC to liberalize and expand the scope of clearing house functions.
